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ABSTRACT 
 
Equity crowdfunding has become a popular method for new ventures to raise 
money by accessing a crowd of potential investors that contribute small amounts of 
capital in return for equity ownership. This research provides a theory and empirical 
support to explain how the crowd’s knowledge affects the types of opportunities 
that are likely to be selected by the crowd. Drawing on absorptive capacity from 
organizational learning theory, the research develops and tests a model of equity 
crowdfunding that explains how inherited knowledge and investment experiences 
will affect the selection of new venture investment opportunities through the 
development of the crowd’s absorptive capacity. Furthermore, the research 
suggests that technology and memory decline limit the absorptive capacity of the 
crowd because they reduce the amount of knowledge that is available among the 
crowd for their decision making in uncertain conditions. The results contribute to 
the research in equity crowdfunding by showing the types of knowledge and 
limitations of knowledge the crowd is likely to experience in the development of 
their absorptive capacity. The model also contributes to the equity crowdfunding 
literature by arguing that the absorptive capacity of the crowd is a significant 
determinant in the types of opportunities that are likely to be successful.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
     Knowledge is a critical factor in the evaluation and exploitation of new venture 
investment opportunities (De Clercq and Dimov 2008; Gompers, et al. 2008; Amit, 
Glosten, and Muller 1990; Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998). Due to high levels of 
information asymmetries inherent in new venture investments, it is tough for 
investors to select investments without knowledge related to the focal opportunity 
(Cumming, Pandes, and Robinson 2013). Since financial capital is essential for 
entrepreneurs to start and grow their new venture (Allison, et al. 2015) and outside 
capital is hard to attract from venture capitalists (VCs) and angels, entrepreneurs 
often count on alternative funding methods to meet their capital needs. Equity 
crowdfunding has emerged as a way for entrepreneurs who are often shunned by 
VCs, angel and other outside investors to access capital. The popularity of equity 
crowdfunding around the world has grown and is estimated to have helped 
entrepreneurs raise over $1.1 billion in capital during 2014 (Massolution 2015). 
Although studies related to information asymmetries and investment decision 
making are well established in literature related to venture capital (e.g. Amit, 
Brander, and Zott 1998; Barry, et al. 1990) and angel investments (Van Osnabrugge 
2000), relatively little is known in the emerging equity crowdfunding literature 
about how the crowd’s  knowledge affects the types of new ventures that are funded 
(Kim and Viswanathan 2014; Moritz, Block, and Lutz 2015). It has yet to be 
determined how effective the crowd is at enhancing entrepreneurial funding success 
in equity crowdfunding and the degree to which the crowd’s knowledge affect the 
types of ventures selected. 
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     Information asymmetries characterize most new venture opportunities. The 
opportunities that entrepreneurs seek to exploit depend on information differences 
within the market (Kirzner 1997; Schumpeter 1934; Venkataraman 1997). The 
information asymmetries arise because the entrepreneur typically knows more 
about the quality of the opportunity than outsiders (Sood 2003). Although 
information asymmetries are an important part of an entrepreneur’s competitive 
advantage, they also have an impact on investors’ decision-making processes in the 
form of potential adverse selection because the investors have to make investment 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty (Cumming 2006). Within the investment 
process, investors with less relevant knowledge about a focal opportunity will have 
higher information asymmetries and a greater difficulty in selecting opportunities 
because the quality of the opportunity is a challenge to evaluate when differences 
in information are great. Information asymmetries make it more difficult for 
investors to identify and reward the best opportunities (Amit, Brander, and Zott 
1998).  
     While prior research in equity crowdfunding has focused on information 
distributions and communications through signals (Ahlers, et al. 2015), this study 
seeks to increase our understanding of how the crowd’s experience and knowledge 
are used to select opportunities for investment. Drawing on absorptive capacity 
from organizational learning theory, the ability to identify, assimilate and exploit 
information about a new venture investment opportunity is strongly dependent on 
the investor’s prior knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; De Clercq and Dimov 
2008). Absorptive capacity is a capability to understand new information because 
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of prior knowledge developed through learning. The crowd’s absorptive capacity 
manifests itself through the relationship between the crowd’s prior knowledge and 
the information provided by entrepreneurs that results in the selection of new 
venture investments. Knowledge plays a critical role in the ability for the crowd to 
evaluate signals and information disclosed by entrepreneurs and other investors in 
the process of making an investment decision. Venture capitalists and angel 
investors are among those that rely on prior knowledge to make informed 
investment decisions and improve their overall performance (Gompers, et al. 2008; 
Van Osnabrugge and Robinson 2000; Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998). The crowd is 
made up of a large group of individuals with various backgrounds, educations, and 
experiences. It is these experiences that allows the crowd to develop capabilities in 
understanding the quality of the information in each investment opportunity. 
Consequently, the types of opportunities that are likely to be funded are dependent 
on the crowd’s absorptive capacity. 
     This research develops a theoretical model to predict what types of opportunities 
are more likely to be financed in an equity crowdfunding context based on the 
absorptive capacity of the crowd. The research addresses the question of how the 
crowds’ knowledge affects the types of opportunities funded and links these 
occasions to funding success. First, the research argues that investors will have 
prior experiences that are useful for evaluating information about an investment 
opportunity. This “inherited knowledge” makes investors more likely to select new 
venture investment opportunities when the investment is in a familiar industry 
because prior experience can be used to resolve information asymmetry problems. 
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Second, the research argues that knowledge development through prior investment 
experiences allows the crowd to learn new knowledge that is useful in selecting 
opportunities in similar ventures. Third, the research demonstrates that investors 
are less likely to choose opportunities that are more technologically sophisticated 
because evaluation and selection of these types of opportunities typically require 
unique and specialized knowledge. Because equity crowdfunding allows the 
general public to invest in new ventures, they are less likely to have the expertise 
necessary to eliminate information asymmetries in these types of technologically 
sophisticated opportunities.  Finally, the research argues that given the dynamic 
nature of the crowd’s active membership and the frequent shifts in focus between 
different types of opportunities, knowledge developed by the crowd is likely to 
decline. Without robust mechanisms for sharing and storing knowledge, the crowd 
is liable to forget.  
    The research makes several theoretical and practical contributions. First, it shows 
capital acquisition in equity crowdfunding is partially dependent on the knowledge 
the crowd has access to before and during their experience on the crowd because it 
allows them to overcome information problems inherint in investment decisions. 
They use this knowledge to develop a capacity to evaluate investment opportunities 
that are highly uncertain. Second, the research shows that the types of opportunities 
selected by the crowd are more likely to be in areas that are more familiar to the 
general public. The research moves beyond the widely held assumption that the 
public generally is not able to determine the quality of a new venture because of 
their lack of financial sophistication (Smith, 2014) by showing that investments 
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made by the crowd follow a predictive pattern based on their abilities to reduce 
information asymmetries in areas that are familiar to them. Finally, the research 
shows that factors unique to the dynamic and public nature of crowdfunding also 
negatively affect the ability of the crowd to develop absorptive capacity and select 
opportunities for investment.  
     Chapter two provides a background of equity crowdfunding and related 
crowdfunding literature. Following the background chapter, a literature review 
provides theory and research related to information asymmetries, investment 
decision making in new ventures, and knowledge development. The fourth chapter 
develops four hypotheses to test. The fifth chapter discusses the methodology used 
in the research. Following the methodology, the results of the analysis are presented 
in chapter six. Finally, the implication of the research on knowledge and equity 
crowdfunding are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2. EQUITY CROWDFUNDING BACKGROUND 
 
     Very few new ventures can obtain outside capital from venture capitalists or 
angel investors and rely on alternative sources to meet the financial capital needs. 
While most entrepreneurs initially rely on personal capital or capital from family 
and friends to start their new venture, they often need additional capital  as their 
new venture begins to grow.  Equity crowdfunding is a nascent phenomenon that 
allows entrepreneurs access to the needed capital from a large crowd of investors 
that each typically make only small contributions to the new venture (Mollick 
2014). While the term crowdfunding is ubiquitous and can define a number of 
alternative funding strategies that use an open call through the internet for the 
solicitation of capital from a group of individuals for non-equity compensation (e.g. 
reward, product exchange, lending, or donation), equity crowdfunding gives 
individuals the opportunity to make an investment in return for equity in the new 
venture (Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher 2014; Schwienbacher and 
Larralde 2010).  Because of the potential for a financial return from equity 
crowdfunding, this type of crowdfunding typically focuses on helping 
entrepreneurs access capital to start or grow their new venture, whereas non-profit 
sharing types of crowdfunding stereotypically fund opportunities related to art, 
education, and technology (Gierczak, et al. 2016). Given the incentives to make a 
potential return and the focus on new venture financing, equity crowdfunding has 
emerged as a viable source of capital for new ventures and a possible substitute to 
other forms of capital acquisition like venture capital for some new ventures 
(Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010). 
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     Since equity crowdfunding is an emerging industry, there has been very little 
peer-reviewed literature focusing on this particular type of crowdfunding and how 
the crowd makes decisions. Most peer-reviewed crowdfunding literature has 
focused on peer-to-peer lending1 (e.g. prosper.com) or reward-based 
crowdfunding2 (e.g. Kickstarter). The one exception is Ahlers et al. (2015) which 
included an analysis of signals that were important in equity crowdfunding 
investments. While there is little research with equity crowdfunding as the 
particular context, there are some studies that provide insight into investment 
decision making in crowdfunding. The following sections review aspects of equity 
crowdfunding and prior research on the decision making of the crowd. 
2.1 Equity Crowdfunding Regulations 
 
     In the United States (US), the enactment of equity crowdfunding legislation and 
the related regulation has been underway for several years. The Jumpstart our 
Business Startup Act (JOBS Act) was passed in 2012 and included an equity 
crowdfunding provision in Title III, named the Capital Raising Online While 
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure (CROWDFUND). Title III was 
designed to make it easier for new and existing private ventures to raise capital from 
“non-accredited” investors through an online platform in exchange for equity in the 
                                                          
1 Peer-2-peer lending platforms seek to  provide microloans to capital seekers from 
crowdfunding participants that expect a share of the interest payments in return in addition to 
the amortization of the loan (Haas, Philipp, Ivo Blohm, and Jan Marco Leimeister. 2014. "An 
Empirical Taxonomy of Crowdfunding Intermediaries.").  
2  Reward-based crowdfunding platforms seek to provide financial capital to capital seekers from 
a crowd that expect a non-financial reward in return (Belleflamme, Paul, Thomas Lambert, and 
Armin Schwienbacher. 2014. "Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd." Journal of Business 
Venturing 29, no. 5: 585-609.).   
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new venture. Although the legislation was passed in 2012, the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which was tasked with creating the regulations, only 
approved the rules in October 2015.  
     Title III provided a new exemption to the Securities Act of 1933 (Security Act). 
Prior to the JOBS Act and the related regulations, when a private new venture 
wanted to raise capital from investors, they either had to “go public”, which is 
prohibitively expensive for most new ventures (Sjostrom Jr 2001), or seek one of 
the few exemptions to the Securities Act that made private investment possible but 
was limited to only a limited number of “accredited” investors (Stemler 2013). 
When the JOBS Act was passed in 2012, it allowed entrepreneurs to solicit publicly 
to investors through a provision in Regulation A. However, this type of solicitation 
still required disclosure with the SEC, was limited to $5 million per year, and was 
expensive for most new ventures (Stemler 2013). Another exemption to the 
Securities Act was Regulation D. This rule made the cost of raising capital less 
expensive by relying on an online platform for solicitation of investments but was 
primarily limited to only “accredited” investors unless the entrepreneur had a 
preexisting relationship with the investor (Sigar 2012).   
     Although Title III regulations only recently passed in the US, many countries 
had already enacted and implemented legislation and regulation that allowed 
entrepreneurs with private ventures in their countries to raise capital from the 
general public through a crowdfunding platform. In Europe, for example, several 
countries including the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and Spain allowed equity 
crowdfunding to take place for some time already. For example, the UK’s Financial 
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Conduct Authority (FCA) authorized their first equity crowdfunding platform at 
the end of 2011. By mid-2014, there were 14 authorized equity crowdfunding 
platforms in the UK, ten additional applications under review and 11 firms that 
served as appointed representatives (Crowdfunding Review, 2015).  
     In the UK, the solicitation for investment in a private company can only be made 
to the general public through a platform. The Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 requires all businesses that operate a platform to become authorized by the 
FCA when providing equity crowdfunding activities. The primary role of the 
authorization is to safeguard investors from misleading information and unfair 
business practices as defined in chapter 4 of the FCA’s Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (Aschenbeck-Florange, et al. 2013). Similar to the US, the UK 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 allows for exemptions from costly filing 
disclosures when the offering made through a platform is less than €5 million in a 
period of 12 months. 
     With regulation being typically country specific, the entrepreneurs soliciting 
investments and the investors providing capital are usually within the same country 
and  are limited in cross-border investments. For example, entrepreneurs using a 
UK crowdfunding platform are prohibited from soliciting investments from 
investors in the United States. Likewise, investors in the US are unable to make 
investments in an equity crowdfunding offers in the UK. While there are 
geographical limitations to making investments in new ventures through equity 
crowdfunding by country because of regulations, research shows that the 
geographic constraints within a country are more relaxed in crowdfunding, and 
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investors make investments at greater distances from the new venture than do 
traditional funding mechanisms like venture capital  (Mollick 2014; Agrawal, 
Catalini, and Goldfarb 2011). 
2.3 Platform Types 
 
     Most regulations limit equity crowdfunding to online platforms that are 
regulated by the governing country’s regulatory authority. For example, funding 
platforms for equity crowdfunding in the US are defined under Title III as websites 
that are registered with the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) for the purpose of providing equity crowdfunding activities to the general 
public. In the UK, the FCA regulates all equity crowdfunding platforms. 
     While regulations govern several disclosure and investment activities, the 
platforms used by entrepreneurs have characteristics that are designed to help link 
the entrepreneur raising capital with the crowd of investors interested in equity 
ownership (Belleflamme and Lambert 2014). These different characteristics of the 
platform impact the success of equity crowdfunding (Moritz, Block, and Lutz 
2015). For example, entrepreneurs are likely to choose platforms that have a large 
crowd of investors because they can solicit their opportunity to more individuals at 
the same time (Belleflamme and Lambert 2014). Likewise, investors are likely to 
choose a platform that has a large number of new ventures because it allows them 
to find an opportunity that better meets their investment criteria and decision-
making capabilities (Moritz, Block, and Lutz 2015). Given that crowdfunding relies 
on small contributions from a large crowd of investors (Mollick 2014) and 
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entrepreneurs are characterized as resource constrained, entrepreneurs need to 
attract a large number of investors with as little cost as possible. 
     On a platform, entrepreneurs connect with the crowd by creating an online 
profile that allows them to distribute information about the investment opportunity. 
Before the campaign launches on the platform, the entrepreneur decides on the 
valuation and sets a funding goal and equity amount offered. In addition to the 
amount sought and equity offered, the platforms also allow the entrepreneur to post 
business plans, videos, financials, and other information that an investor can use to 
evaluate the potential of the opportunity. The platform also typically allows 
communication between the entrepreneur and investors through email and public 
discussion boards. Entrepreneurs also try to establish additional credibility on the 
platform by linking their social media accounts.  
     Crowdfunding platforms commonly fall under two different models (Cumming, 
Leboeuf, and Schwienbacher 2015). First, the all-or-nothing model gives 
entrepreneurs the opportunity to raise capital from the crowd. However, if they do 
not meet their predetermined funding goal, they receive none of the money 
invested. The purpose of the all-or-nothing model is to limit risk by only allowing 
entrepreneurs access to capital when they have attracted a sufficient number of 
investors to fund the opportunity. The second platform type is the keep-it-all model. 
This model allows entrepreneurs to raise capital toward their predetermined goal 
but keep all of the investment regardless of whether or not the goal is reached. 
While both models are useful for raising money, the large amount of capital needed 
and the added risk of new venture investments make the all-or-nothing model in 
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the most likely for investors that want to limit risk (Cumming, Leboeuf, and 
Schwienbacher 2015). Research shows that the crowdfunding platform model 
affects the type of projects that are funded. Using data from two different reward-
based platforms that varied in the model type, Cumming et al. (2015) showed that 
all-or-nothing models were more likely used by projects that were large, whereas 
the keep-it-all models were more often used by small projects. 
     The internet also makes information easier and cheaper to obtain. Because the 
crowdfunding campaigns take place on a web platform, the information is relatively 
inexpensive to access, consistent across users, and irrespective of an investor’s 
location. The internet allows individuals within an online community to share 
valuable information to solve problems (Afuah and Tucci 2012). The platform 
capabilities are likely to allow members of the crowd to collect information with 
fewer resources. For example, investors access information that can be used in their 
funding decisions from any location when using crowdfunding platforms (Agrawal, 
Catalini, and Goldfarb 2011). These findings differentiated crowdfunding from 
venture capitalists because previous research suggested that venture capitalists 
invest in new ventures that were in proximity in order to reduce the risk of adverse 
selection and moral hazards (Lerner, 1995; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Conversely, 
crowdfunding is less reliant on gathering information in close proximity to the new 
venture’s physical location to resolve information problems in the investment 
decision-making process (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2011). However, little 
is known about the issues arising from moral hazard and the ability for investors to 
monitor new ventures because of the greater distance of investors in crowdfunding 
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than in venture capital or angel investing. Regarding the reduction in information 
asymmetries, some features like social network connections, online updates, and 
discussion boards reduce the difficulties for the crowd to resolve the information 
problems (Mollick 2014). For example, in a crowdfunding campaign, the crowd 
can view discussion boards that include other investors’ questions, comments, or 
concerns that are useful in helping them understand the quality of an opportunity. 
2.4 The Crowd 
 
     In equity crowdfunding, the crowd refers to the general public (Smith, 2014) 
and differs from other groups of investors that use online platforms to invest as 
“accredited” investors (e.g. series D and angels). With equity investments in new 
ventures available to the public, entrepreneurs have access to a new and large 
source of capital to meet their financial needs. The crowd’s main goal for 
participating in equity crowdfunding is the possibility of financial payoff (Lin, 
Prabhala, and Viswanathan 2013). Given the majority of the crowd are “non-
accredited” investors (Authority 2015; Sood 2003), entrepreneurs will raise less 
capital from each investor and rely on participation from a large subset of the crowd 
to meet their financial capital needs (Mollick 2014). The average investment 
portfolio from investors participating in equity crowdfunding in the UK was £5,414 
in 2014, with one-third of the investors contributing less than £1,000 (Baeck, 
Collins, and Zhang 2014). Despite the lack of large individual capital investments, 
the crowd can be vast and provide a number of new ventures with funding. For 
example, Crowdcube, the largest UK equity crowdfunding platform, has over 
260,000 registered investors, having added 61,592 investors in 2014 and 116,845 
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in 2015 (Crowdcube 2015; Crowdcube 2016). With this vast crowd of investors, 
over 381 ventures on Crowdcube have raised more than £150 million from 2011 to 
the end of the first quarter in 2016. 
     As the crowd comprises a large number of individuals, there is likely wide 
variations in their backgrounds, interests, and experiences that incorporate the 
knowledge useful in reducing information asymmetries in new venture investment. 
However, given that the majority of the general public are “non-accredited” 
investors and are characterized as having less financial sophistication and 
experience relevant to new venture investments (Smith 2014), the crowd will vary 
in their selection of new ventures to support compared with traditional funding 
sources (e.g. venture capital). When the crowd determines that the venture’s 
opportunity has a potential return, they will invest in the new venture (Ahlers, et al. 
2015). However, with ample probability of adverse selection problems occurring 
in new venture investments, rational investors without the ability to resolve 
information asymmetries will likely not invest in the new venture because their 
inability to reduce the risk of adverse selection will increase the probability that 
they will make investments in opportunities with no expected returns (Amit, 
Brander, and Zott 1998). For equity crowdfunding to be successful, the crowd must 
be able to reduce information asymmetries and have capital to make investments. 
     The role of investors in providing salient information to other investors to help 
them reduce the risk of adverse selection has frequently been studied in new venture 
financing literature. For example, Lerner (1994) researched the use of syndication 
among venture capitalist and found that venture capitalist syndicate their 
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investments in new ventures because it allows them to share information that is 
useful in determining the best quality opportunities. While he also found that 
venture capitalist were least likely to syndicate with other venture capitalists that 
were less knowledgeable because of the risk of free-riding, the crowd is more likely 
to share information and support with the each other when the investment requires 
a significant number of participants to be successful.    
     Research in equity crowdfunding has also provided empirical validation for the 
value of information provided by investors to the decision-making process. For 
example, Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2015) examined 8,638 comments made by 
investors on the public discussion board of crowdfunding campaigns and found that 
the comments were significantly related to funding success. Also, when they broke 
the comments up into types, they found that the most impactful comments for the 
financing of the campaign were investors that offered help to the entrepreneur, 
followed by suggestions for improvements and statements of investments for a 
second time. Similar to stock market rallies where less sophisticated investors are 
more likely to invest late because of the lack of knowledge or access to information, 
Zhang and Liu (2012) found that herding was a behavior among members of the 
crowd in a peer-to-peer lending platform and many lenders contribute to campaigns 
that were already well funded. Likewise, crowds on an equity crowdfunding 
platform were more likely to invest in a campaign that had almost reached their 
funding goal (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2011). The reasoning behind the 
herding behavior was that the crowd relied on investments by others as information 
to inform their investment decisions. These investments served as signals of quality 
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to other less informed members of the crowd. In peer-to-peer crowdfunding, the 
observation of other lenders’ investments was used to lower the perception of 
default risk  (Herzenstein, Dholakia, and Andrews 2011). Similarly, Kim and 
Viswanathan (2014) studied the role of experts in crowdfunding. They found that 
those investors that were considered experts had an influence on the later 
investments of the crowd because they were perceived to have more knowledge 
about the quality of the opportunity. Because experts are perceived of having more 
knowledge that is useful in selecting high-quality opportunities, their investments 
were viewed as a credible signal of an opportunity’s quality. While expert investors 
can reduce information asymmetries by directly evaluating the claims made by the 
entrepreneur, the less knowledgeable investors often will benefit from the signals 
of other investors to inform their decisions. While each of these studies examines 
how information from investors affects the crowd’s decisions, they do not discuss 
how relevant knowledge is used in determining the value of the information.        
2.5 The Entrepreneur 
 
     Research also points to the value of information provided by the entrepreneur as 
an important factor in an investor’s ability to reduce the risk of adverse selection 
(e.g. Ahlers, et al. 2015; Allison, et al. 2015). In equity crowdfunding, empirical 
evidence supports the propositions that entrepreneurs can help resolve the 
knowledge differences for investors by providing information. For example, 
researchers commonly examine how updates and comments made by entrepreneurs 
on the public discussion boards during a campaign serve to inform investors about 
the opportunity. These comments and updates affect the successful funding of a 
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crowdfunding campaign. Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2015) studied 89 new 
ventures from several German crowdfunding platforms between 2011 and 2014 to 
understand the dynamics of crowdfunding decisions based on information provided 
by the entrepreneur in the form of updates. The dynamics of the investor decision 
making was impacted by updates because the update served as new information 
that was not available at the start of the campaign. They find that entrepreneurs that 
post updates to the public discussion board during the campaign increase the 
subsequent funding of investors the next day by 17.8%.  
     Mollick (2014) studied Kickstarter, a popular type of non-equity crowdfunding, 
and found that the level of preparedness represented on the crowdfunding campaign 
was a signal of quality and increased the probability of successfully raising capital. 
In the study, he measured preparedness as the degree that the individuals seeking 
funds had prepared their campaigns before their launch to set of standards that 
included a video and updates within the first three days. Both sources of 
information used as proxies for preparedness of the project were significantly 
related to crowdfunding success. Furthermore, the study included additional 
measures for proxies of preparedness by measuring the number of spelling errors 
that were in the campaign. He found that the number of spelling errors was also 
significantly related to crowdfunding success or failure. These proxies served as 
valuable signals in the decision-making process of investors in this type of 
crowdfunding. In an equity crowdfunding context, Ahlers, Cumming, and Gunther 
(2015) also examined signals as salient information provided by an entrepreneur 
and the impacts on funding success. In their study of 160 new ventures participating 
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in equity crowdfunding in Australia, they found that entrepreneurs that provide 
financial statements, external certificates and information about their board of 
directors were more likely to achieve funding success on an equity crowdfunding 
site. 
     Similarly, Moritz, Block, and Lutz (2015) interviewed 23 participants in equity 
crowdfunding to determine the role of communication between the entrepreneur 
and the crowd in the reduction of information asymmetries. They found that 
entrepreneurs were unable to rely on conventional communication strategies (e.g. 
face-to-face contact) in interactions between the entrepreneur and the crowd 
because the small investment amounts from each investor made the cost of common 
communication strategies prohibitive. Instead, the entrepreneurs developed 
pseudo-communication strategies to provide salient information to the investors 
through online capabilities found on the platform and the media richness of online 
communications. Some pseudo-communication strategies entrepreneurs used in the 
crowdfunding campaigns included social media tools that allowed investors to view 
social connections, online discussion boards where updates and comments were 
posted, and a forum where videos were presented in the campaign. Lin, Prabhala, 
and Viswanathan (2013) studied 205,132 online crowdfunding campaigns in a 
peer-to-peer lending context to test the role of social networks on the outcomes. 
Although the crowdfunding platform was designed for credit and did not allow 
entrepreneurs to offer equity, their study found that the social network of the 
borrower improved their likelihood of crowdfunding success when the borrower’s 
friends participated in the process and were visible and verifiable to other lenders 
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through the social network. They conclude when a lender’s social network 
participates in the crowdfunding campaign as investors, the investments made by 
these individuals serves as valuable information that other investors use in their 
decision-making process. In sum, the information provided by entrepreneurs is 
crucial in the decision-making process. However, the research does not explain how 
knowledge plays a role in identifying what information is valuable.  
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Information Asymmetries 
  
     Information asymmetries make the decision-making process of equity 
investments difficult for investors because they have to determine the quality of an 
opportunity in uncertain conditions. Akerlof’s (1970) seminal work on the risks that 
arise from the differences in information described the impacts of information 
asymmetries in buying and selling used cars. Specifically, the seller of a car would 
try to provide information to the buyer about its quality. However, the consumer 
faced a problem of determining the credibility of the information disclosed by the 
seller because the seller could misrepresent, either deliberately or inadvertently, the 
actual quality of the car. The result of the information gap between the two parties 
led to high-quality cars being unable to attract their value because the buyer was 
unable to determine the vehicle’s value with the limits in information. As a result, 
high-quality sellers left the market when they were unable to attract the correct 
value. When these sellers left the market, the overall quality of the market was 
reduced, and the equilibrium car was of poor quality. Thus, information 
asymmetries led to the risk of adverse selection for buyers where the equilibrium 
value was poor. 
     Although research on information asymmetries and the risks of adverse 
selection has been studied in various contexts (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1992; Spence 
1973), the new venture financing context has a high probability of adverse selection 
because of the abundance of information asymmetries between investors and 
entrepreneurs (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998; Cumming 2006; Gompers 1995) and 
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the tendency for equity investors to attract poor quality opportunities in greater 
numbers than other types of new venture financing (Amit, Glosten, and Muller 
1990; Myers and Majluf 1984).  Equity investments tended to attract a large number 
of poor quality opportunities because entrepreneurs did not have to provide 
downside protection to investors in the case of default (Cumming 2006). For an 
investor, there was a large risk when making an equity investment in a privately-
held venture because of the high probability of failure among startups, illiquidity 
of equity, and lack of available information needed to evaluate the quality of the 
venture (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998; Amit, Glosten, and Muller 1990; Wright 
and Robbie 1998). Equity rewards investors with high potential returns when a new 
venture is successful but provides no investment protection from the loss when the 
new venture fails. In a failed new venture, equity investors have the potential to 
lose their entire investment. In contrast to Ahler’s example of high quality sellers 
leaving the market, the new ventures have traditionally had few alternatives to leave 
the market, resulting in the swelling of the market with both high and low quality 
opportunities. While the high quality opportunities in equity investments remain in 
the market, the problems related to the attraction of poor quality opportunities 
combined with the high information asymmetries makes it difficult for investors to 
sort out the high quality opportunities. As a result of the limitations to equity 
markets, the average return of an investment in a new venture is negative (Amit, 
Brander, and Zott 1998). In the presence of information asymmetries and the risk 
of loss, investors experience a high probability of adverse selection when making 
equity investments in new ventures. Investors reduce the risk of making poor equity 
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investments by using their knowledge to determine the quality of an opportunity 
from information provided by the entrepreneur (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998).  
3.2 Investment Decision Making  
 
     In new venture financing, research on investment decision making has suggested 
that the ability of an investor to select new venture opportunities of high quality 
and above average returns is based on an investor’s perception of risk and return 
(Dimov and Shepherd 2005; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984) and their ability to decrease 
risks or improve returns (Amit, Glosten, and Muller 1990). Knowledge plays a 
major role in the decision-making process of investors by helping them reduce the 
risk of making poor investment decisions by resolving information asymmetry 
problems (Cumming 2006). For example, Amit, Glosten, and Muller (1990) found 
that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs were faced with the risk of adverse 
selection because asymmetric information problems made it more difficult for 
investors and entrepreneurs to negotiate the value of the opportunity. However, 
venture capitalists were able to reduce the risk by using their skills and experiences 
(MacMillan, Zemann, and Subbanarasimha 1987). Entrepreneurs were viewed as 
being able to better understand their abilities and the value of the opportunity 
compared to outside investors (Backes-Gellner and Werner 2007; Busenitz, Fiet, 
and Moesel 2005), while investors accessed this information from the entrepreneur 
or other sources (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998; Sood 2003; Cumming 2006). 
Rational investors that were unable to reduce the level of information asymmetry 
would not invest because the risk of making poor investments was greater (Amit, 
Brander, and Zott 1998; Amit, Glosten, and Muller 1990). The impact of 
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information asymmetries suggests that the crowd needs to reduce the level of 
information asymmetries before making an investment. Otherwise, they are likely 
to select investment opportunities that have negative expected return (Amit, 
Brander, and Zott 1998). 
     Those investors that have relevant knowledge in determining the quality of the 
focal venture’s opportunity have the potential to make investments in new ventures 
by resolving the information asymmetries. Amit et al. (1998) argued that venture 
capitalist were able to exploit their knowledge by conducting due diligence and 
establishing the quality of an opportunity was above a threshold that made the 
investment have an expected positive return. The threshold was a perception of 
quality that also relied on the venture capitalist’s knowledge to determine. Based 
on the decision-making process in new venture investments, investors with these 
higher levels of knowledge will find new ventures to support so that entrepreneurs 
can exploit the opportunity. When an investor makes the investment, both the 
entrepreneur and investor can share in any potential future payoffs. Nonetheless, 
venture capitalists are less likely to participate in crowdfunding because of the risk 
of free riding by less informed investors that can exploit the knowledge of the 
venture capitalist at the venture capitalist’s expense (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998; 
Lerner 1994).  
     Not all investors with relevant knowledge have sufficient capital to invest alone, 
nor do they have a personal network of other investors with knowledge and capital. 
Instead, these investors also rely on alternative mechanisms to make investments 
in new ventures. By enlisting in a crowd, investors with knowledge can also depend 
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on the financial capabilities of other members of the crowd to meet the capital needs 
of a new venture. Although this type of investor is required to share in potential 
payoffs with other members of the crowd, they are unable to receive any portion of 
a payoff outside the crowd because they fail to meet the capital needs of the new 
venture without others. Their inability to fund the needs of a new venture alone 
results in failure to exploit the opportunity and receive any potential payoffs.  With 
this logic, a knowledgeable investor with capital limitations is motivated to 
participate in equity crowdfunding to access potential payoffs of new venture 
opportunities. While an investor may have financial resources, they are limited in 
capital when the total amount they make available to invest in new ventures is 
constrained by their investment strategy. For example, a person is considered 
constrained if they have enough capital to fund the whole need of a new venture 
but chooses not to make the full investment because it will exhaust funds necessary 
to diversify. Those with larger amounts of capital can meet the needs of new 
ventures and have a diversification strategy compared to investors that are limited 
in their available financial capital for new venture investments and cannot fund a 
new venture and diversify to the same extent. Without crowdfunding, a 
knowledgeable investor that is capital constrained fails to invest in a high-quality 
opportunity with a potential positive expected payoff and loses any chance to share 
in potential payoffs because the entrepreneur is unable to exploit the opportunity. 
     Whereas investors with relevant knowledge have the potential to make an 
investment in a new venture by resolving information asymmetries, less 
knowledgeable investors do not have capabilities to make decisions that result in 
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above average positive returns and will likely choose not to invest (Amit, Glosten, 
and Muller 1990). Thus, rational investors without relevant knowledge in 
determining the quality of an opportunity are limited in their potential investment 
behavior. Crowds are less likely to fund opportunities where the crowd is comprised 
of investors with less relevant knowledge. With the decision-making process 
limiting the ability to invest, entrepreneurs are unable to exploit any opportunities 
and both the entrepreneur and the investor lose any chance to share in potential 
payoffs. In oreder to improve their ability to make investments, the crowd is 
motivated to learn. When the crowd learns from experiences, the crowd develops 
new knowledge that they can use in their investment decisions making process. In 
addition, the reduction of information asymmetries from investments that are more 
familiar to the crowd increases the likelihood that the investment is an opportunity 
that has a potential positive return. 
     For equity crowdfunding to be a success, the crowd needs to be motivated to 
participate and be able to resolve information asymmetries. While the main 
motivation for participating in equity crowdfunding is to obtain a financial return 
on an investment, the motivation does not explain why the crowd works together 
to resolve information asymmetries. Instead, the crowd is motivated to work 
together in crowdfunding to take advantage of the various resources of knowledge 
developed from prior experiences that help resolve information asymmetries and to 
access financial capital from each other. As a result, the crowd as a whole is more 
likely to select opportunities that have a potential positive return. 
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3.3 Knowledge Development and Absorptive Capacity 
 
   Cohen and Levinthal (1990) defined absorptive capacity as the capability to 
identify, assimilate and exploit new information to improve performance. Their 
theory argued that absorptive capacity was dependent on prior learning 
opportunities. They argued that the ability to access the value of new information 
was dependent on prior knowledge. They used this theory to explain how R&D 
spending improved an organization’s capability to recognize and exploit new 
knowledge in the environment. While their research focused on R&D spending, 
innovation, and learning, the absorptive capacity construct has also been used to 
explain a variety of phenomenon related to strategy (Zahra and George 2002; 
Schilling 1998; Lane and Lubatkin 1998). Zahra and George (2002) argued that 
absorptive capacity was a dynamic capability that impacted a firm’s competitive 
advantage by allowing them to better access information from their environment to 
improve performance. The construct has also been used in new venture financing 
literature to explain the performance of venture capitalists in the investments made 
in new ventures. For example, De Clerq and Domov (2008) studied how venture 
capitalists developed internal knowledge through their investment experiences. In 
their research on new venture financing, absorptive capacity was used to explain 
the capabilities of a venture capital firm to evaluate investment opportunities in 
uncertain conditions by relying on prior investment knowledge to inform their 
investment criteria. Their research suggested that prior investments provided 
deeper knowledge of a specific industry. This in-depth knowledge allowed the VCs 
to evaluate information provided by new investment opportunities with a better 
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understanding of the value of the information. In their research, the absorptive 
capacity of a venture capital firm was manifest through the evaluation and selection 
of investments.  In addition, the uncertain conditions inherent in new venture 
investments were mitigated through prior investment experiences because the 
venture capitalists were able to gain more familiarity with the investments process 
when they made frequent investments in a new venture (Dimov, de Holan, and 
Milanov 2012) 
     The key to absorptive capacity is that it is founded on prior experiences that 
provide opportunities for learning (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman 1996). An organization can develop absorptive capacity from internal 
knowledge development or access to external sources of knowledge (De Clercq and 
Dimov 2008). A primary source of an organization’s absorptive capacity is made 
up of the existing range of knowledge that members of the organization bring with 
them when they join (Shane 2003). Huber (1991) referred to this type of 
organizational knowledge as “inherited knowledge.”  He suggested that an 
organization is significantly impacted by the kind of knowledge that individuals 
bring with them into an organization because it impacts the types of future 
experiences that the organization will use for learning. There are two ways that this 
range of knowledge impacts the development of an organization’s absorptive 
capacity. First, the inherited knowledge impacts how the organization interprets 
new information (Shane 2000; Yu 2001). Second, the inherited knowledge impacts 
the exploitation of new information it acquires because it allows organizations to 
apply existing knowledge to new opportunities (Yu 2001). For example, existing 
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stocks of knowledge related to market needs allow an organization to serve those 
demands better (Venkataraman 1997). Within new venture financing, inherited 
knowledge about market demands can allow an investor to better determine the 
quality of an investment opportunity. While the investor does not serve the needs 
directly, they can invest in new ventures that meet those needs because the investor 
better understands the market demand.  
     There are several  factors that impact the development of inherited knowledge 
within an organization (Shane 2003). For example, an organization can be made up 
of individuals with variations in employment characteristics like job functions 
(Roberts 1991; Klepper 2001), industry differences (Casson 1995; Knight 1921), 
and locations (Casson 1982). In addition, they can have variations in the levels of 
education (Shane 2003). Finally, they can have access to different degrees of social 
networks that provide information (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). In equity 
crowdfunding, the crowd is made up of a diverse group of individuals. Each of the 
individuals that join the crowd brings with them a different set of experiences that 
comprise their inherited knowledge. No two members of the crowd are likely to 
have the same inherited knowledge. However, individuals in the crowd are likely 
to have similar experiences that collectively improve the inherited knowledge of 
the crowd in a specific area. For example, individuals within the crowd with 
different past educational experiences but similar working experiences are likely to 
have a greater inherited knowledge related to the work experiences than with the 
educational experiences. Because a crowd is made up of members with variations 
in their inherited knowledge, there will be differences in the types of experiences 
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that result in an absorptive capacity of a crowd. Consequently, the crowd is likely 
to develop an absorptive capacity from members’ experience that are more 
frequently observed in the crowd. 
    Knowledge development is also a process of learning that results from direct 
experiences within the organization (Huber 1991). There are various activities that 
an organization can undertake to acquire new knowledge. Knowledge development 
comes through the process of experiential learning (Huber 1991). Organizations 
develop this type of knowledge through repeated experiences by individuals within 
the organization (Levinthal and March 1993). Typically, these repeated experiences 
for learning are embedded in an organization's processes and procedures (Zahra and 
George 2002), which helps with the transfer of tacit knowledge (Kogut and Zander 
1993). For example, venture capitalists develop “rules of thumb” from prior 
investment experiences to increase the efficiency of processing information about 
an investment opportunity (Dimov, de Holan, and Milanov 2012). For example, 
they may only invest in new ventures that are in markets that they had previously 
invested in because it limits the cost and time of acquiring new knowledge about 
different markets. In new venture financing, prior investment experiences provide 
useful information that VC can use in the development of an absorptive capacity 
(De Clercq and Dimov 2008). For example, prior investments provide access to 
networks of individuals that contribute to the understanding of a particular industry 
that the investment is made in (Sorenson and Stuart 2001). In crowdfunding, prior 
investments may shape to some degree the knowledge developed because the crowd 
has access to new information from these investments. As a result, the absorptive 
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capacity of the crowd will likely be able to better identify and exploit information 
from new opportunities when it is related to prior investments. 
3.4 Organizational Memory 
 
     While knowledge is often kept between individuals and groups through 
processes and procedures adopted within the organization (Zahra and George 2002; 
Kogut and Zander 1993), organizations can also forget (Argote, Beckman, and 
Epple 1990). Knowledge begins to erode over time when there are not mechanisms 
for hard coding, systems, or routines for storing and retrieving the knowledge 
(Huber 1991) or when the knowledge is not used frequently (Holan and Phillips 
2004). In organizations, forgetting also occurs because of turnover or shifts in the 
organization’s interests (Dimov, de Holan, and Milanov 2012).  
    One challenge of absorptive capacity within crowdfunding is the dynamic nature 
of the crowd. The crowd does not have the sophisticated social integration 
mechanisms found in complex organizations to easily store knowledge among 
members of the crowd. Research about the transferring of information in equity 
crowdfunding research has mostly suggested that knowledge is dispersed through 
comments and updates from investors  (e.g. Ahlers, et al. 2015). While there are 
limits to organizational memory in equity crowdfunding that will result in some 
decline in the absorptive capacity of the crowd, there are also features of 
crowdfunding that improve the memory. First, the crowd is made up of a vast 
number of individuals with inherited knowledge that can be used to develop the 
absorptive capacity of the crowd through grafting. Grafting refers to the addition of 
new members into an organization. Each of these members brings with them a stock 
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of inherited knowledge that can be useful in evaluating the investment 
opportunities.  Second, successful crowdfunding campaigns rely on a large number 
of individual investors. This large size reduces the need for knowledge transfer 
between members because the more members of the crowd access the knowledge 
through direct experiences.  
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CHAPTER 4. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
    Knowledge helps resolve the asymmetric information problems inherent in new 
venture investments when the knowledge is relevant to the focal venture’s 
opportunity (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998). The ability to exploit information 
about an opportunity and resolve the asymmetric information problems is partially 
dependent on prior relevant knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  An 
individual, organization or crowd obtains relevant knowledge through a process of 
learning (Levinthal and March 1993). They learn by acquiring information from 
direct experiences and from information about experiences of others (Huber 1991). 
By acquiring knowledge through learning, an entity is able or should be able to 
improve their absorptive capacity for identifying and exploiting new information 
about an investment opportunity (De Clercq and Dimov 2008).  
     The crowd’s ability to determine the quality of an investment opportunity by 
identifying exploiting information about the investment opportunity is a function 
of the existing stock of knowledge individuals in the crowd obtained before 
participating in crowdfunding and knowledge that is gained through new 
experiences in the crowdfunding process.  This knowledge improves the crowd’s 
capabilities of evaluating new information about a focal venture opportunity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The research looks at both existing knowledge and 
knowledge development among members of the crowd.  First, the crowd is 
comprised of a large group of individuals that brings with them an existing stock 
of knowledge from prior experiences. Second, the crowd acquires new knowledge 
from the experiences they have related to investments made on the crowdfunding 
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platform. While the existing knowledge that the individuals bring with them to the 
crowd provides them with some capabilities in identifying opportunities, they can 
also increase their relevant knowledge associated with new venture investments by 
learning from prior investments made in equity crowdfunding campaigns.  Third, 
knowledge related to technological opportunities impacts their ability to make 
investments. Technological opportunities make it more difficult for the crowd to 
develop and exploit their absorptive capacity because of the special skills and 
knowledge related to these types of opportunities (Gupta and Sapienza 1992; 
Norton and Tenenbaum 1993; Sorenson and Stuart 2001).  
4.1 Inherited Knowledge 
 
    Inherited knowledge likely impacts the absorptive capacity of the crowd because 
the stock of knowledge that the crowd brings with them makes it possible for the 
crowd to identify better and exploit the new information provided by a venture’s 
equity crowdfunding campaign. With information asymmetry problems inherent in 
new venture investments (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998), the crowd’s likelihood of 
understanding the value of an investment opportunity increases with their ability to 
recognize and exploit the limited information they have available (Shane 2003). 
Within a large crowd, the inherited knowledge allows the crowd to better examine 
investment opportunities when the absorptive capacity derived from their existing 
knowledge stock is related to the focal venture’s opportunity. For example, prior 
education was found to improve the performance of a venture capitalist because it 
allowed them to have skills necessary to evaluate investment opportunities in areas 
related to their education (Dimov and Shepherd 2005). Similarly, the crowd is 
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likely to have past experiences that allow them to better evaluate opportunities in 
areas related to those experiences. 
         When evaluating a focal venture’s investment opportunity, the crowd is more 
likely able to understand investment opportunities when the new venture is in a 
familiar industry (Sitkin and Pablo 1992; Dimov, de Holan, and Milanov 2012). 
The crowd is made up of the general public and often considered “unsophisticated” 
because they lack background characteristics and financial capabilities that are 
associated with “sophisticated”  or “accredited” investors (Smith 2014). However, 
the crowd is on an equal footing with “sophisticated” investors when the focal 
venture’s opportunity is in an industry that the general public has frequent 
opportunities to gain experiences, such as retail and food services. Unlike VCs that 
often specialize in a particular technology or industry because they are unable, with 
limited resources, to have broad experience about a diverse number of industries 
and technologies (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984), the crowd is more likely to be familiar 
with a larger number of industries and opportunities that they frequently experience 
because the size of the crowd provides larger variations in  background 
characteristics of the members than traditional funding sources. These variations 
support the ability of the crowd to better identify opportunities in areas that are 
often shunned by VC and angels. For example, while only 3% of angel investors3 
and 7% of investing partners in the top 100 VC firms were women4, women made 
                                                          
3 https://www.crowdcube.com/2013/ 
4 https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/19/the-first-comprehensive-study-on-women-in-venture-
capital/ 
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up 27% of the investments made in new ventures through Crowdcube5. Where the 
venture capital industry is overwhelmingly male and tends to select opportunities 
led primarily by male teams, there is an increased likelihood that women investors 
within the crowd will understand opportunities that are shunned by VCs and are led 
by teams of women (Greene, et al. 2001). In addition, 44% of members of the crowd 
participating on Crowdcube were considered “everyday” investors6 and do not 
qualify as “accredited” or “high net worth” individuals. For example, these types 
of investors are likely exposed to various different kinds of products and services 
as consumers or work in levels of organizations that expose them to different 
customer experiences. These experiences, accessible to the public, improve the 
absorptive capacity by relying on prior experience in evaluating certain types of 
new venture opportunities. The crowd is likely to manifest their absorptive capacity 
through the selection of new venture in areas that they have prior experience which 
will enhance the prospects for new ventures in certain industries and hinder funding 
outcomes in other industries (De Clercq and Dimov 2008).   
     Despite the diversity of backgrounds, there are experiences that are more likely 
to be shared among members of the crowd. Employment experiences, for example, 
are likely shared experiences when viewed within an industry group because the 
industry provides a more uniform knowledge cluster. Typically, an industry is 
considered to have firms that provide similar knowledge development when it 
                                                          
5 https://www.crowdcube.com/infographic 
6 Everyday investors are “restricted investors” under FCA regulations and are not allowed to 
invest more than 10% of the income in privately held ventures. 
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comes to information sources like R&D intensity, market size, market growth, and 
profitability of their industry (Shane 2003).  
       The crowd is likely to have experiences based on industries that are widely 
accessible to the public. Industries that employ a larger portion of the population 
are likely to impact the inherited knowledge of the crowd because there is a greater 
probability that the members of the crowd have been employed in one of these 
industries compared to industries that only employ a small portion of the 
population. In previous venture investment literature, industries played a key role 
in the decision making of venture capitalists because they were able to derive 
knowledge useful in reducing the risk of poor investments within particular 
industries which with they had experience (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998). The 
crowd’s inherited knowledge of a focal industry makes it easier to resolve 
information asymmetries because their absorptive capacity improves the ability to 
evaluate and understand a focal venture’s opportunity (De Clercq and Dimov 
2008). Because investors will select opportunities where they are more likely to 
have familiarity (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998), the crowd is likely to focus on 
industries where they have more relevant inherited knowledge.  
Hypothesis 1: Inherited knowledge will increase the likelihood of 
equity crowdfunding success. 
4.2 Knowledge Development 
 
    In new venture investments research, prior investment experience impacted the 
development of absorptive capacity because it provided access to information that 
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could be used by investors in future investment decisions (De Clercq and Dimov 
2008). Similarly, prior investments made in crowdfunding are likely to increase the 
absorptive capacity of the crowd because the information from these investments 
will give the crowd additional understanding about market demands, technology, 
and profitability that can be used to evaluate new investment opportunities in 
similar focal areas (Shane 2003).  
    The development of new knowledge requires repeated experiences in a focal area 
(Levinthal and March 1993). An investment experience is a valuable mechanism 
for learning and developing knowledge because it provides the crowd with direct 
experiences that are enhanced through a form of feedback directly related to the 
future decision making of the crowd (Huber 1991). Whereas some factors can be 
studied about the process of investments in new ventures, some of the knowledge 
necessary to better identify and exploit opportunities can be understood only by 
executing the investment and learning from the results (Duchesneau and Gartner 
1990). Because crowdfunding requires only small amounts of capital to participate 
(Mollick 2014), there are greater likelihoods that members of the crowd will gain 
knowledge from prior experiences. A large number of investors is critical for the 
development of absorptive capacity within crowdfunding because the knowledge 
gained from prior experiences is tacit and difficult to transfer (Saviotti 1998; 
Simonin 1999; Szulanski 1996; Kogut and Zander 1993). The transfer of 
knowledge is especially problematic when there is a lack of routines and processes 
within an organization for the transfer of knowledge (Zahra and George 2002). 
Without strong and established routines and processes for transferring knowledge, 
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the crowd will have a more difficult time developing absorptive capacity 
capabilities. However, the need to transfer knowledge between members decreases 
as a large number of investor that participate in investments gain direct experiences 
that are useful in future investment decisions. These direct experiences provide 
relevant knowledge that helps the crowd understand and evaluate new opportunities 
for investment (De Clercq and Dimov 2008; Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
     Prior venture capital and angel investment research show that investors make 
investments in new ventures where they have prior investment experience because 
they can use their experiences to better understand the quality of a new investment 
opportunity (Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Van Osnabrugge 2000). Furthermore, the 
more success a venture capitalist has in previous investments activities, the higher 
the likelihood that they will invest in the same focal area in the future (Gompers, et 
al. 2008). These prior investment activities generate knowledge that venture 
capitalists and angel investors use to improve their abortive capacity in future 
investment opportunities. As they continue to invest in specific areas, they gain 
additional relevant knowledge that benefits decision-making in future opportunities 
in the same area. As a result, specialization often occurs in the venture capital 
industry and in some angel investment groups. Similarly, the prior investments 
made by venture capitalists in areas outside of the focal area of an opportunity 
decreased the likelihood that the venture capitalist would invest in that industry 
despite the opportunity’s positive potential returns (Gompers, et al. 2008).  
     When the crowd is evaluating new investment opportunities, they are more 
likely to understand and evaluate the information when they have had previous 
48 
 
investment experiences related to the focal venture’s opportunity. When the 
investment is in the same category, the derived knowledge from these investment 
experiences helps the crowd understand the complexity of new opportunities and 
the new information being presented by the entrepreneurs. The crowd is less likely 
to resolve information problems using prior investment experiences if the focal 
venture’s opportunity is outside the industry of prior investments regardless of the 
opportunities potential. The crowd is also likely to benefit from the specialization 
resulting from frequent investments in particular industries because of knowledge 
developed from these experiences help them enhance their absorptive capacity. 
Hypothesis 2: Prior investment experience by the crowd in a focal 
area will increase the likelihood of equity crowdfunding success. 
4.3 Technological Knowledge     
 
    However, when the focal venture’s opportunity is also technologically 
sophisticated, the absorptive capacity of the crowd may not be sufficient to identify 
and evaluate information about an investment opportunity. Technology is more 
complex and likely to negatively impact the development of absorptive capacity 
within the crowd in a situation of technology because understanding technology is 
more expensive and time-consuming  (Afuah and Tucci 2012; Cohen and Levinthal 
1990; Galunic and Rodan 1998; Kogut and Zander 1996).  Wright and Robbie 
(1998)  argue that information asymmetry problems vary with different levels of 
technological sophistication because technologies often require specific skills and 
knowledge to be able to evaluate them. Venture capitalists tend to take the time and 
expense to specialize in technologies because it provides them with a competitive 
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advantage (Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Gupta and Sapienza 1992; Norton and 
Tenenbaum 1993).  Although some members of the crowd potentially have 
expertise about a specific technology that can be used to evaluate the complexity 
of technological opportunities, this knowledge is less likely to be found among the 
crowd. Because crowdfunding requires investments from a large number of 
individuals, this constraint of knowledge to only a few reduces the likelihood that 
a new venture will be able to raise capital from the crowd. 
      Because technology decreases the number of crowd members with related 
knowledge, the crowd is less likely to be able to identify and evaluate opportunities 
that are more technologically sophisticated in a large enough number to 
successfully fund the new venture. Furthermore, the technology opportunities are 
characterized as having more information asymmetries problems. As a result of the 
information asymmetries and lack of absorptive capacity to evaluate the 
information, the crowd will likely not invest in opportunities that are 
technologically sophisticated. Given that crowdfunding relies on small investments 
from a large number of the investors, the lack of knowledge need to develop a 
strong absorptive capacity will negatively impact the selection of new ventures that 
are more technologically sophisticated. 
Hypothesis 3: Technological opportunities will decrease the 
likelihood of equity crowdfunding success. 
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4.4 Knowledge Decline 
 
     While variations in experiences provide the crowd with opportunities to develop 
absorptive capacity, the knowledge used in the identification and exploitation of 
new investment opportunities may also erode within crowdfunding because of the 
lack of coding, systems, or routines for storing and retrieving the valuable 
knowledge (Huber 1991). While the crowd is likely to gain knowledge useful in 
making an investment from prior experiences, they are also likely to forget some of 
the previously gained knowledge that is useful in making investment decisions. 
Whereas VCs often code information within their organizations to help prevent a 
loss of knowledge (Dimov, de Holan, and Milanov 2012), the crowd must 
continually replenish the stock of knowledge because of the lack of systems to store 
it among members of the crowd. This loss of knowledge will likely have a negative 
impact on the success of new ventures participating in equity crowdfunding.  
    Organizations often forget specialized knowledge over time because they lack 
persistence, experience frequent interruptions, or are delayed in their use of the 
knowledge (Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990). In an organizational setting, 
Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990) found a rapid decline in available knowledge 
occurs within an organization when the knowledge is not continually replenished. 
Given the dynamic nature of organizations (e.g. turnover and production cycles), 
organizations typically struggle to maintain their valuable knowledge capabilities. 
    Venture capital research also shows that knowledge developed through the 
investment process can decline when the information is not frequently used. Dimov, 
Martin de Holan, and Milanov (2012) found that knowledge gained from making 
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an investment in early-stage new ventures declined when the VCs made 
investments in other stages of new ventures. As a result of the decline, the VCs that 
did not continually replenish the knowledge related to early-stage new venture 
investments were less likely to make a future investment in early-stage new 
ventures. When the VCs attention shifted to other stages, the knowledge necessary 
to identify and exploit opportunities in a highly uncertain condition declined.  
    The dynamics of crowdfunding also make it likely that there will be a decline in 
knowledge. In particular, crowdfunding does not have the complex mechanism to 
transfer and store important knowledge among members of the crowd. Currently, 
most information shared between investors comes in the form of comments and 
investment signals (Ahlers, et al. 2015). Furthermore, crowdfunding is also 
expected to have turnover because investors are investing less capital. In order to 
maintain the success of crowdfunding, the crowd also needs to continually increase 
in size to offset the turnover. These characteristics of crowdfunding are likely to 
negatively impact the absorptive capacity of the crowd through a loss of knowledge. 
Because there is a decline in knowledge among the crowd, new ventures are less 
likely to be successful when the crowd is not able to frequently replenish their 
knowledge.      
Hypothesis 4: Declines in knowledge will negatively impact the 
success of equity crowdfunding campaigns         
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CHAPTER 5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Sample Context 
 
     Data on the investment decisions of the crowd was hand collected from 
Crowdcube Limited, a UK internet equity crowdfunding platform. A UK site is 
preferable in testing the hypotheses because the laws governing equity 
crowdfunding in the UK allow for much greater participation by the crowd than is 
currently available within the United States. Crowdcube Limited is one of the 
largest equity crowdfunding sites in the UK. In 2014, the platform made available 
equity offers from 330 new ventures. During 2014, Crowdcube had 1,124,537 
individuals visit the site, an average of £139,211 invested per day (£5,800/hour), 
active investors in 91 countries, and an addition of 61,592 new investors7. An 
account was created online, and each campaign was reviewed for the data used in 
the analysis. In addition to Crowdcube, data was collected from Company House, 
a UK government site that provides information about companies registered in the 
UK. This site provided information about each new ventures’ incorporation. 
Finally, data about employment was also collected from the UK Office of National 
Statistics. 
     The dependent variable was taken from new venture campaigns participating on 
the equity crowdfunding platform starting in August 2015 and continuing until the 
end of August 2016. A sample size of 177 new ventures that participated in 
campaigns during the period of data collection was included in this research. The 
                                                          
7 www.crowdcube.com/2015 Accessed 11/12/2015 
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research sample had a success rate of 54.8% and raised over 67 million pounds. 
The sample included new ventures from 17 different categories selected from 
options created by the crowdfunding platform, 37 various industries (2 digit SIC) 
and a range of technology. The sample was able to attract over £67.8 million pounds 
during the campaign. Given that the crowdfunding site only allowed access to funds 
if the new venture met their funding goal, the total capital available to successful 
new ventures was just over £60 million. 
5.2 Dependent Variables 
 
     Since Crowdcube used an all-or-nothing model of rewarding new ventures that 
meet their funding goals, SUCCESS was measured as a dichotomous variable with 
1 representing new ventures that were successful in meeting their predetermined 
funding goal and 0 for those new ventures that did not access any capital from the 
crowdfunding campaign. The success of a campaign was a common measure in 
crowdfunding literature (Mollick 2014). New ventures were incentivized to select 
a goal that would help them launch or grow their business. While success meant 
different things for new ventures with higher or lower goals, the measure in this 
analysis was used to capture just the success of the equity crowdfunding campaign 
and not the value of the funds raised for the longer-term performance of the new 
ventures. In the discussion of control variables, the need to control for funding goals 
is explained as an important factor in the decisions made by the crowd. 
    A second dependent variable was used as a robustness check. FUNDING was a 
continuous variable that measured the number of funds each campaign was able to 
raise on the equity crowdfunding site. It has also been used in some crowdfunding 
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literature (Ahlers, et al. 2015). While the platform was an all-or-nothing model and 
limited access to funds to only campaigns that met their goal, the model was 
expected to have a similar impact on this variable because investors are likely to 
invest more capital into new ventures that they better understand.  
5.3 Independent Variables 
 
     INHERITED knowledge was measured by collecting industry employment data 
from the general population in the UK and matching the data to the industries of 
each of the new ventures in our sample. The logic for using industry employment 
information from the census is to capture the most likely shared experiences of the 
general public. The reasoning suggests that if there were a larger number of 
individuals employed in a specific industry than employed in another industry, then 
the crowd is likely to have a larger amount of knowledge in that industry where 
more of the general public was employed. To collect the data about industry 
employment, the 2015 UK census from the Office of National Statistics was 
retrieved. The census included the total employment of the census population 
broken down into 20 clusters with an average employment across these clusters of 
1.22 million.  
     After collecting the industry employment information, the measure was 
calculated following Gompers et al. (2008). The inherited knowledge relevant to 
industry was measured by taking the ratio of the total number of individuals 
employed in an industry division and dividing it by the total number of employed 
in all industry divisions. The divisions were provided in the UK census. 
Consequently, the ratio is an approximation of the inherited knowledge in the crowd 
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because it measures the likelihood that the crowd has experience in an industry 
division. The measure was used to test hypothesis 1. Table 1 includes the divisions, 
SIC codes, and ratios used in the measure. The more inherited knowledge the crowd 
has in a specific industry, the more likely they are to invest in that given industry. 
The top three industry with the greatest approximated inherited knowledge included 
retail, human health activities, and professional activities. The divisions with the 
least amount of approximated inherited knowledge included mining, activities of 
households, and electrical. While the census information does not provide an exact 
measure of the crowd’s inherited knowledge, given the anonymous nature of the 
crowd, the census was the best available approximation of the crowd’s experience 
because the size of the crowd and the diversity of the crowdfunding opportunities 
increases the likelihood that the crowd was distributed in their employment 
opportunities similar to the general public from which the crowd is drawn.  
    Studies that have used census data to append settings where little information is 
available (e.g. community health) have suggested that aggregate measures using 
census data are weaker than measures using micro-level data (Geronimus and 
Bound 1998). In particular, the measure creates errors-in-variable because the 
aggregate measure will imperfectly represent the micro-level variable. As a result, 
there is a possibility for under or over interpretation of the inherited knowledge 
measure in a non-linear model. However, the size of the sample in this research 
helps to minimize these concerns.    
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  A total of 243 prior investments made by the crowd were taken to develop a 
measure for EXPERIENCE. The experience measure was used to test hypothesis 2 
and measure the knowledge learned from prior investment experiences. The 
variable was expected to explain how prior investments provided knowledge for 
the crowd to exploit information about new investment opportunities. Given that 
prior investments experiences allow access to information that is unavailable to 
others (Sorenson and Stuart 2001), the prior investments are a source of knowledge 
developed within the crowd. Similar to the variable measuring inherited 
knowledge, the measure was designed following Gompers et al. (2008). To create 
the measure, the variable took the total number of successful campaigns in each of 
the 17 categories prepared by Crowdcube and divided the total by the total number 
of successful campaigns. When a new venture creates a campaign, it can select from 
some categories. The categories differ from industry classification. For example, 
the category of Food and Beverage falls into a number of different industries like 
manufacturing of food, manufacturing of beverages, and food services. The ratio 
was calculated by taking the total number of successful campaigns in a category 
and dividing it by the total number of successful campaigns in all categories. This 
measure provides a level of specialization within the crowd based on prior 
experience in a category. Table 2 provides a list of the 17 categories with their ratio 
of experience. 
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    To measure TECH, two graduate students in businesses independently coded the 
campaigns into a dichotomous variable with 1 representing new ventures that are 
technologically sophisticated and 0 for new ventures that were not technologically 
sophisticated. In general, the coding was based on the amount of technology 
described within the campaign. New ventures were coded TECH when the 
campaign description included information about software, apps, algorithms, and 
patents. After coding 20 cases and resolving differences among the two coders, the 
remaining cases from the sample were coded. A test of inter-rater reliability showed 
a strong reliability between raters (Kappa = 81.39%). Appendix A includes 
examples of excerpts of campaign pitches and their associated coding. The measure 
of TECH examines the impact technologies have on the development of absorptive 
capacity. The measure is used to test hypothesis 3. Because technologies typically 
require specials skills and knowledge to evaluate (Wright and Robbie 1998), the 
crowd is less likely to be able to select opportunities when they are more 
technologically sophisticated.  
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    Finally, DECLINE was a measure of the erosion of knowledge among the crowd. 
In particular, knowledge used in making investment decisions is expected to decline 
when it is not frequently used and replenished (Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990). 
As a result, the crowd is likely to forget specialized knowledge developed through 
investment experiences when there is a delay in use, a shift in attention, or a 
turnover of individuals (Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990; Benkard 1999). The 
dynamics of equity crowdfunding platforms tend to make it difficult for the crowd 
to maintain knowledge developed within the crowdfunding process. For example, 
the crowdfunding platform exacerbates the problem by offering a large number of 
new campaigns in various different categories at a frequent rate. They likely do this 
to increase the probability of making a profit since the platform receives a portion 
of the invested funds when the campaign is successful. This introduction of 
different types of campaigns makes it more difficult for the crowd to use knowledge 
because of the delay in use and shift in attention that is detrimental to maintaining 
knowledge. In addition, equity crowdfunding is likely to have a consistent turnover 
in the crowd because of the limited amount of capital individuals in the crowd have 
available to invest in new ventures. Consequently, equity crowdfunding platforms 
and entrepreneurs need to continually attract new investors into the crowd with 
capital available to invest. When new investors enter the crowd, they lack the 
knowledge developed by previous members of the crowd that have left the crowd. 
This turnover within crowdfunding manifests itself through a decline in useful 
knowledge among the members of the crowd.   To measure decline, the research 
follows Dimov, Martin de Holan, and Milanov (2012) by looking at each category 
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and taking the log number of new campaigns that were introduced to the members 
of the crowd that were outside that category since the last successful campaign in 
the focal category. 
5.5 Control Variables 
 
    The research also included several control variables suggested from past research 
in new venture financing decisions. Research on the feasibility of investments in 
new ventures (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998) suggests additional variables that 
need to be controlled for in our model because they have been argued as salient in 
the decision-making process of investors. STAGE was a measure of a new 
venture’s stage of business. New ventures that were less than a year old were coded 
with a 1 and firms older than one year were coded with a 0. Since a large number 
of new businesses fail and new firms have less of a history for investors to rely on 
(Wright and Robbie 1998), new ventures in the early stage are likely to impact the 
investment decisions of the crowd because there are greater information 
asymmetries.   
    EQUITY was a measure of the total amount of equity ownership that was made 
available to investors on the crowdfunding site. The amount of equity offered 
impacts the decisions of the crowd because when a new venture offers more equity, 
it allows the crowd to share in more of any future payoff and reduces the risks 
associated with the investment opportunity (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998).   
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     Finally, GOAL was a measure of the total amount of investment sought from 
the crowd by a new venture. This measure provided a proxy for the cost of the 
investment. The cost of the investment was an important factor in new venture 
financing because the cost was one of the main variables in determining whether 
an investment had a positive expected return (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998).  
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5.6 Procedure 
 
     Logistic regression was used to regress investment success and failure from the 
direct effects of  INHERITED, EXPERIENCE, TECH and DECLINE while 
controlling for GOAL, EQUITY, PREVIOUS SUCCESS, and STAGE. Logistic 
regression was useful when there was a dichotomous dependent variable. 
Furthermore, logistic regression was chosen over discriminant analysis because the 
former method did not require multivariate normality of independent variables 
(Gilbert, 1993). The model considered the variables to be a probability function that 
takes a value of 1. The logistic equation is expressed as follows:  
ln [
P(𝐶𝑖 = 1)
1 − P(𝐶𝑖 = 1)
] =  𝐴0 +  𝑋𝛽 
where P(Ci =1) is the probability that the new venture i will successfully raise 
capital from the crowd. The β is a vector of the coefficients of the independent 
variables X. The coefficients in a logistic regression are represented as log odds 
and tell about the relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable. In a logistic regression, the dependent variable is on a logit 
scale. The research uses the following model to test the hypotheses: 
ln [
P(𝐶𝑖=1)
1−P(𝐶𝑖=1)
] =  𝐴0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑇 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 +
 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸 +  𝛽5𝐺𝑂𝐴𝐿 +  𝛽6𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑂𝑈𝑆 𝑆𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 +
 𝛽8𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐺𝐸  
    As a check on the robustness, a second model that used an alternative measure 
of success was also analyzed. In this model, the total amounts raised by the 
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campaigns and not just the success of the campaign was the dependent variable. 
While the all-or-nothing model determines what campaigns access capital based 
on achieving the predetermined goal, there was an expectation that the 
independent variables would also improve the likelihood that a new venture 
would raise capital regardless of meeting the goal. An OLS regression was used to 
regress the independent variables on the amount raised by each campaign as a 
robustness check of the model.  The OLS model is expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑇 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 +  𝛽3𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 +
 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑂𝐴𝐿 +  𝛽6𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑂𝑈𝑆 𝑆𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 +
 𝛽8𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝜀   
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS 
 
      Table 4 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the 
variables used in this research. Table 5 reports the logistic regression and OLS 
regression coefficients, standard errors, log-likelihood, chi-square and R-squared 
statistics In Table 4, several of the variables are significantly correlated. The 
dependent variable SUCCESS is significantly and positively correlated with 
INHERITED, EXPERIENCE, GOAL, and PRIOR SUCCESS. The dependent 
variable is also significantly and negatively correlated with DECLINE. These 
variables all correlate in the expected direction of the hypotheses. Thus, there is 
initial support for Hypotheses 1,2 and 4. Although the variable for TECH also 
correlates in the correct direction, TECH is  not significantly correlated with 
SUCCESS. While there are a number of statistically significant correlations, all of 
the correlations have relatively weak associations. Also, the variables were checked 
for multicollinearity issues by examining the variance inflation factors (VIF). All 
of the variables are below the acceptable threshold with a range between 1.1 and 
1.23.      
    In Table 5, Model 1 reports the coefficients for all of the control variables used 
in the analysis. Three control variables are significant in the OLS regression 
analysis. In the logistic regression analysis, previous success had a high standard 
error because all of the new ventures that had previous successful campaigns were 
successful in the sample. To check the impact of the standard error on the results, 
the analysis was tested with both the previous successful variable included and 
excluded. There was no differences in the direction or significance of any of the  
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additional variables in the analysis when the variable for previous success was 
excluded. Previous success was significant and positively related to the amount of 
money raised in Model 8. 
   In Table 5, Models 2-5 reported the coefficients calculated using logistic 
regression to test Hypotheses 1-4. As an additional check, Model 6 includes all of 
the variables added simultaneously. All of these models showed a significant 
improvement over the base model. In Model 7, the amount raised was used as the 
dependent variable to do an additional check of robustness. Because amount raised 
is a continuous variable, Model 7 relied on OLS regression to report the 
coefficients. The R-square reported for model 7 was 54%.  
6.1 Hypothesis Tests  
 
     The research finds strong support for Hypothesis 1. The hypothesis argues that 
inherited knowledge of the crowd positively influences the probability of a new 
venture being successful in their equity crowdfunding campaign. There is a positive 
and significant effect in Model 2 (β = 11.12, p < 0.01) and Model 6 (β = 9.38, p < 
0.01). The results indicate that the crowd relies on knowledge from their 
employment experiences in different industries to help them evaluate, understand 
and invest in new investment opportunities. The standardized odds ratio suggest 
that the crowd is more than 1000 times more likely to invest in a new venture when 
it is related to retail (largest) than investment opportunities in household 
employment (smallest). As a result, new ventures that are in industries with a larger 
ratio of inherited knowledge among the crowd are more likely to be successful. In 
particular, new ventures that are related to the retail industry have the highest 
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probability of success in their equity crowdfunding campaigns because it is the 
largest source of inherited knowledge. Conversely, new ventures with opportunities 
related to industries like real estate and entertainment have the lowest probability 
of success. Thus, the crowd is more likely to invest in opportunities where they can 
rely on prior employment experiences related to a focal venture. 
    Similarly, the research finds support for Hypothesis 2. The hypothesis argues 
that prior investment experiences on the crowdfunding site would positively impact 
the probability of a new venture being successful in their equity crowdfunding 
campaign because the prior experiences provide useful knowledge to evaluate new 
opportunities in similar categories. Model 3 in Table 5 reports a positive and 
significant effect of prior experience (β = 3.70, p < 0.05). An increase in the number 
of prior investments made by the crowd in the same category of the opportunity 
increases the likelihood that the new venture will be successful in their campaign. 
Specifically, the standardized odds ratio suggests that new ventures are 40 times 
more likely to be successful when they are in opportunities related to highest 
category (Food) compared with opportunities in the lowest category (Film). While 
experience is not significant in model 6 which contains all of the variables including 
the controls, Model 7 in Table 5 shows that experience is positive and significant 
when the control variables are removed from the regression.  Model 7 shows that 
the control variables expend valuable information in Model 6 in Table 5 but  do not 
provide additional meaning to the specific model because the variables are not 
significant.  To test the impact of the control variables, Model 7 in Table 5 removes 
the control variables. While the control variables are theoretically justified to be 
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included in the analysis, they are only significant in Model 8 of Table 5. 
Consequently, in Model 7, both experience and inherited knowledge are positive 
and significantly related to the success of  a new venture. It is important to note that 
while inherited knowledge is likely to have some impact on investment experiences 
because what the crowd knows potentially impacts their investment decisions that 
become the source of experience, the two variables are not significantly correlated 
in Table 4 and work simultaneously in Model 7 of Table 5 to explain the variation 
in success.  
    The research also finds support for Hypothesis 3, which argues that 
technologically sophisticated opportunities would negatively impact the crowd’s 
probability of investing in a new venture’s campaign because the specialized 
knowledge necessary to evaluate, understand, and invest in technology 
opportunities is less likely to be found among the members of the crowd. In Model 
4 of Table 5, there is a negative and significant effect of technology on the 
likelihood of success (β = -0.74, p < 0.05). Specifically, the standardized odds ratio 
in Model 4 suggests that new ventures with technologically sophisticated 
opportunities are nearly half as likely to attract investment from the crowd that will 
make them successful than opportunities that are not technologically sophisticated. 
While this result supports Hypothesis 3, Tech is not significant in Table 5, Model 
6 which includes all of the variables added simultaneously. In Table 5, Model 6 and 
Model 7, the results suggest that variables related to knowledge and experience 
among the crowd are likely more important determinants to the success of a new 
venture’s fundraising efforts than the lack of knowledge about a technologically 
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sophisticated opportunity. Thus, the crowd may discount what they don’t know 
about an investment opportunity while relying more on the value of their 
knowledge. 
   Finally, the research finds strong support for Hypothesis 4, which states that a 
decline in knowledge is likely to negatively impact the probability of success in 
crowdfunding. There are negative and significant effects in Model 5 (β = -0.94, p 
< 0.01)  and Model 6 (β = -0.78, p < 0.05).  The standardized odds ratio suggests 
that a new venture is nearly half as likely to be funded by the crowd when there is 
an increase in the number of new campaigns being presented to the crowd since the 
last investment success in a focal category. As the new investments opportunities 
are presented, the crowd tends to forget knowledge from experiences they had with 
a specific focal area that could be used in future investments and the odds of new 
ventures in the same area decline. New ventures have the highest probability of 
being successful when their campaign occurs near the same time as a similar 
successful new venture.  
    As a check of robustness, the hypotheses were also testing using the total amount 
raised as the dependent variable. It is expected that there would be similar results 
using the total amount raised because the amount raised is an important factor in 
the success of a new venture on equity crowdfunding. However, the amount raised 
also looks at the model beyond the dichotomous nature of equity crowdfunding’s 
all-or-nothing model. Model 7 in Table 5 report the coefficients for the control and 
independent variables using an OLS regression. The results report a significant and 
positive effect for prior investment experience (β = 0.92, p < 0.05), which provides 
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additional support for Hypothesis 2. There is also support for Hypothesis 4 in the 
OLS regression. There is a negative and significant effect of the decline in 
knowledge among the crowd (β = -0.196, p < 0.01). The regression had an R-square 
statistic of 54%, suggesting that a little more than half of the variance in the model 
is predicted by the variables. Although the control variables were not significant in 
the logistic regression, three variables were significant in the OLS regression.  
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Discussion 
 
    This research develops and tests a model to explain the impact of knowledge on 
the investment behavior of the crowd in equity crowdfunding by arguing that the 
absorptive capacity of the crowd is critical in the probability that a new venture 
will be successful in equity crowdfunding. While prior research in crowdfunding 
and much of entrepreneurial research have focused on the capabilities of the 
entrepreneur and characteristics of the campaigns (Burns, et al. 2015; Moritz and 
Block 2016), this research takes the crowd as the starting point in explaining the 
types of equity crowdfunding campaigns that get funded. In particular, the 
analysis supports the model that absorptive capacity of the crowd plays a critical 
role in the funding outcomes of new ventures because the knowledge capabilities 
it employs helps investors make decisions in uncertain conditions where 
information asymmetries exist. In particular, the knowledge capabilities of the 
crowd provide it an advantage in reducing the uncertainty of an equity investment 
in areas that are familiar to it. This research focuses on equity crowdfunding as 
the context for understanding how crowd makes investment decisions in uncertain 
new ventures. While this research only focuses on one type of crowdfunding, the 
framework is useful in research related to other forms of crowdfunding. The study 
offers several important contributions to theory and practice.  
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7.2 Contributions and Implications 
 
    By drawing on the well-developed absorptive capacity construct from 
organizational learning theory, the research contributes to the literature by showing 
that the crowd can learn and development knowledge that can be used to identify 
and exploit investment in new ventures. The crowd faces differing dynamics 
compared to traditional organizations that have systems and routines to develop, 
store and transfer knowledge. Consequently, the crowd develops an absorptive 
capacity to understand investment opportunities by relying on experiences and 
knowledge they develop individually but manifest collectively through the 
selection of new venture investments. It is the group’s collective knowledge 
capability that is used to successfully select opportunities for investments. Given 
the abundance of information asymmetry problems in new venture investments, it 
is essential that the crowd use knowledge in their investment decisions. In this 
research, there are two knowledge mechanisms that are significantly related to the 
success or failure of an equity crowdfunding campaign. Existing stocks of 
knowledge that the crowd brings with them from their employment and knowledge 
developed while participating on the crowdfunding platform both provide useful 
capabilities to evaluate new investment opportunities. However, two mechanisms 
also restrict the knowledge capabilities. Specifically, technology sophisticated 
opportunities and knowledge decline reduce the available knowledge among the 
crowd in their decision making.  The research supports previous literature in new 
venture investment decisions that argued that knowledge would play a major role 
in the decision making in new venture investments by showing that a crowd 
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behaves in a predictable manner despite the lack of strong organizational systems 
(De Clercq and Dimov 2008).  
    The results of the analysis suggest that new ventures participating in an equity 
crowdfunding campaign have a higher probability of getting funded when the 
crowd has existing knowledge related to the opportunity. In particular, the crowd 
develops an absorptive capacity from prior industry experiences that they use to 
identify and exploit information about the investment opportunity. This finding 
offers an alternative to the assumption that the crowd lacks the knowledge to make 
investments in new ventures with large amounts of information asymmetries 
because knowledge capabilities among the crowd allow them to reduce these 
asymmetries (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998; Smith 2014).  Prior research argued 
that venture capitalists and angel investors were more capable of making 
investments in new ventures because of their knowledge (Lerner 1994). However, 
this research empirically supports the use of knowledge by the crowd in their 
investment decisions and suggests they are also capable of making investment 
decisions in new ventures when they have knowledge related to the investment 
opportunity.  
    In addition, the research suggests that there is likely a difference of investment 
knowledge capabilities between VCs and the crowd. Whereas VCs concentrate in 
areas that their knowledge provides a competitive advantage in their due dillegence 
techniques and efficeincies (De Clercq and Dimov 2008) such as software, 
biotechnology, and the internet (Gompers and Lerner 2001; Amit, Brander, and 
Zott 1998), the crowd’s capability allows them to specializes in industries where 
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their knowledge can play a critical role such as retail and food services. While 
individuals in the crowd are not likely to have a greater degree of knowledge 
compared with individual venture capitalists and angel investors in industries like 
food and retail, the collective knowledge that forms an absorptive capacity provides 
the crowd with an unique mechanism for resolving information asymmetries in 
these types of industries. By sharing common knowledge from industry experience, 
the crowd is able to reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty related to 
those specific industries. In contrast, the individual knowledge of a venture 
capitalist or angel investor is potentially less likely to resolve the informaiton 
asymmetries necessary to make the investment in this type of new venture because 
the types of uncertainty that are likely important in these industries are less likely 
to be be resolved through traditional due dillegence technique. For example, it is 
impossible for an investor to resolve uncertainty regarding a food product’s demand 
by mere analysis. However, a crowd with an absorptive capacity related to the 
opportunity is more likely to deduce the demand and reduce uncertainty because 
the collective decision making in a well understood food product decreases this 
type of uncertainty. In contrast, the crowd is less likely to be able to resolve 
information asymmetries related to high tech industries because they lack prior 
experiences that provide knowledge necessary to reduce the different types of 
uncertainty found in these industries. However, VCs and angels that specialize in 
high tech industries are likely to have absoprtive capacity capabilities that provide 
a competitive advantage for reducing information because their knowledge about 
the industry helps resolve certain types of uncertainty.  The types of  industries 
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pursued by VCs compared with the crowd are likely different because of the 
variances in how each of their knowledge capabilities help resolve the uncertainty 
of the investment.  
    The results also show support for prior investment experiences as a source of 
knowledge used among the crowd for investment decisions. Specifically, the crowd 
is more likely to select opportunities in the same categories as previous investments. 
While specialization is also true in the VC industry, venture capitalists typically 
have a very narrow specialization, whereas, the crowd can have many areas of 
specialization because of their size. As a result, a type of specialization develops 
among the crowd in some different categories. The results add to existing literature 
by arguing that learning from investment experiences in crowdfunding will affect 
the selection of opportunities of the crowd by providing new knowledge that can 
be used in the evaluation of investments in the same category. While venture capital 
literature has studied the link between prior investment experiences and new 
venture investment decisions (De Clercq and Dimov 2008; Sorenson and Stuart 
2001), research in equity crowdfunding had not determined how the crowd used 
prior investment experiences. This research shows that the crowd’s ability to rely 
on prior investment experience in the selection of investment opportunities is an 
important contribution to understanding what types of opportunities are likely to be 
successful on equity crowdfunding. 
    There is also strong empirical support for the decline in knowledge used among 
the crowd between investments. Specifically, evidence from the research suggests 
the idea that the crowd is less likely to make investments in areas where they have 
78 
 
previous experiences as new and varying opportunities are presented to the crowd. 
The value of the knowledge gained from identifying and investing in an opportunity 
may be quickly lost by the crowd because of the lack of systems to store and transfer 
the knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1996). Once knowledge is gained, there is no 
guarantee that it will remain because of the dynamic nature of crowdfunding. For 
example, the crowd is likely to have turnover in the members that limits the 
usefulness of previous investment experiences. While venture capital literature 
suggests the importance of experience and knowledge (De Clercq and Dimov 
2008), the development of knowledge is offset by the loss of knowledge. This 
implication is essential for crowdfunding because it suggests that the success or 
failure of new ventures is partially determined by the ability of the crowd to 
replenish the knowledge they gain from prior experiences.  
7.3 Implications for Technology Opportunities     
 
    In the analysis, the research found empirical support for the impact of technology 
on the decision of the crowd. The argument provided in the research suggested that 
because technology is harder to understand for investors without specialized 
knowledge and skills, they are less likely to invest in a new venture that is 
technologically sophisticated (Junkunc 2007; Gupta and Sapienza 1992). While 
there is statistical significance in one of the models, technology is not supported in 
any other model. This limited support for the technological sophistication of new 
venture suggests that the selection of new venture investments is likely to rely more 
on what the crowd knows about a new venture’s opportunity than what they may 
not know about a technology. As a result, technology does not remain significant 
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in the models where inherited knowledge and experience are included. While 
relying on what the crowd knows is an important factor in the decision making of 
the crowd, the discounting of what they don’t know may have an impact in the 
future performance of the crowd.  
    The lack of significance in some of the models may also partially attributed to 
two factors found in the sample of equity crowdfunding. First, some descriptions 
of technology in the new venture investment literature suggest that technology 
sophistication in the investment decisions is impacted by the stage of the 
technology. In particular, that technology impacts the investment decisions 
differently when it is in different stages of development because the information 
asymmetries that influence decisions are greater in early stages of technology 
compared with later stages of the technology. Early stage technologies are more 
uncertain and more difficult for investors to evaluate for investors because the 
technology lacks a track record useful in decision making. However, in the sample, 
there was not a large variation in the stage of the technology. Most technologies in 
the crowdfunding campaign were existing technologies with long track records that 
could be used by investors to better understand the investment opportunity. Second, 
some research also suggests that technologies increase the amount of capital 
invested in a new venture because technology is assumed by investors to provide a 
greater probability for a much higher payoff (Townsend and Busenitz 2015; 
Bygrave and Timmons 1992). Thus, the crowd may make investment decisions in 
technologies based on the probability that these opportunities may have greater 
payoffs than on their understanding of the opportunity. Future research will benefit 
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from looking at technology opportunities that are at different stages of development 
because these stages impact the risk and uncertainty of the opportunity.  
    Consequently, new ventures participating in equity crowdfunding that have 
technologically sophisticated opportunities may still find it harder to raise money 
from the crowd. This empirical result is  in sharp contrast to the thinking of venture 
capitalists and angel investors that often specialize in technologies and industries 
that seek opportunities that are technologically sophisticated (Amit, Brander, and 
Zott 1998; Junkunc 2007).  
    From a practical point of view, crowdfunding may be better suited for the less 
technologically sophisticated opportunities because the crowd is better able to 
understand and reduce information asymmetries in these types of opportunities. In 
addition, venture capitalists and angel investors often ignore these kinds of 
opportunities because their specialized knowledge may be less competitive in 
resolving the types of uncertainty that are important in these types of investments. 
As a result, their competitive advantage is less likely to help them find opportunities 
that offer sufficient returns when they are in types of industries that do not require 
technological knowledge. In contrast, the crowd fills this gap by providing financial 
resources to new ventures that are often avoided by venture capitalists and angels 
and are more likely to be familiar to the crowd.  While these opportunities might 
not provide the same financial returns as an investment in technology, they are 
easier to evaluate given the knowledge capabilities of the crowd. 
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7.4 Implications for Crowdfunding 
      The research also contributes the emerging literature on crowdfunding (see 
Moritz and Block 2016) by showing that the knowledge capabilities of the crowd 
have a critical impact on the funding success. Whereas most research in 
crowdfunding has focused on the entrepreneur and the content of the campaign, this 
research adds to the literature by focusing on characteristics of the crowd. With a 
focus on the crowd, some researchers have begun to look at topics including, for 
example, herding, (Kim and Viswanathan 2014), geographical limitations (Ahlers, 
et al. 2015) and social relationships (Liu, et al. 2015). However, this research is the 
first to look at how knowledge of the crowd impacts equity investment decisions. 
In addition, this research looks at the emerging equity crowdfunding as its context 
for understanding the investment decisions. Most research in crowdfunding to date 
has used other types of non-equity crowdfunding as the context because the 
availability of data in equity crowdfunding is harder to obtain.  
7.5 Implications for Practice 
 
    Since equity crowdfunding relies on contributions from a large number of 
individuals (Mollick 2014),  the findings suggest that the crowd needs to 
continually replenish the stock of knowledge used to identify and evaluate 
opportunities for investment to keep a large knowledge base actively participating 
in the crowd by attracting new members or by increasing the knowledge base of 
incumbent members. Furthermore, crowdfunding platforms would potentially 
benefit from mechanisms that allow the crowd to develop and store knowledge. For 
example, the crowdfunding site could provide a forum for questions and answers 
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to be discussed among members of the crowd. Additional resources that allow the 
crowd to follow and track prior opportunities would possibly serve as a tool for 
additional capability development. 
    From an entrepreneur’s perspective, crowdfunding can act as a viable source of 
external capital when the new venture’s opportunity is in areas that are more 
familiar to the crowd. Also, they will achieve the highest probability of success 
when the opportunity is less technologically sophisticated, so the crowd has less 
uncertainty in their investment decision. There is also support for entrepreneurs to 
time their campaigns because timing a campaign at the same time as another new 
venture within a similar area improves the likelihood that they will attract the 
knowledge base from the crowd to improve their performance in crowdfunding.  
7.6 Limitations and Future Research 
 
     This research is not without limitations. First, the theory argues that the crowd’s  
knowledge is critical in understanding the types of opportunities that are successful 
in equity crowdfunding. One limitation of studying the crowd is that the identities 
of the individuals that are participating are not available to researchers. 
Consequently, the research is unable to use measurements of knowledge at the 
micro level. However, this limitation has been noted as a common constraint of 
empirical studies of organizational learning mechanisms (Dimov, de Holan, and 
Milanov 2012). In prior studies of the theory, the measurements were often not 
directly observed, but characteristics of the organization were ascribed to the 
patterns observed in the data.  
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    While there is support for these types of measures, this assumption may only be 
true when there is a large crowd participating and when the platform does not 
specialize in any particular type of new ventures. Where there is specialization in 
the types of new ventures a crowdfunding platform lists on their site,  there would 
be an assumption that the members that select into that crowd would have more 
relevant knowledge to the types of opportunities being made available to them. In 
this research, the sample is taken from one of the largest platforms in the world 
with a high variation in types of new ventures participating and a large crowd. 
Future research would benefit by testing the model developed in this research to 
other crowdfunding platforms. While this research only tests equity crowdfunding, 
the model may also be tested in other types of crowdfunding (e.g. reward-based) to 
increase the generalizability of the model.  
     Second, there is a limitation in the use of success or failure as a dependent 
variable because it does not capture the long-term performance of the new venture. 
Given the short history of crowdfunding throughout the world, the research uses 
the success as the dependent variable to look at the performance of the new venture 
only in the capital acquisition process. The measures used for success of a new 
venture in most crowdfunding research relied only on the new venture reaching 
their funding goal or some other measure that excluded any information of the 
future realization of the opportunity (e.g. Allison, et al. 2015; Mollick 2014). While 
this is a limit to testing if the knowledge allows the crowd to select opportunities 
with a higher probability of payoff, a new venture that is successful at raising capital 
increases their likelihood of success in the future (Bates 1995; Carroll and Hannan 
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2000; Taylor 2001). Future research can follow new ventures that have participated 
in crowdfunding in the past to determine better the quality of the opportunities that 
are being funded and separate failure from quality opportunities from failure from 
poor management. Future research can also compare the effectiveness of the crowd 
in selecting high-quality opportunities compared to other specialized venture 
capitalists and angel investors.  
     Another source of potential research opportunities in the future is to examine 
longitudinally how the crowd’s knowledge changes over time as the crowd grows 
larger and more diverse. This research examines inherited knowledge and prior 
investment experiences of the crowd as important factors in decision-making. 
However, there are important implications to this model as the crowd grows larger 
and more diverse (March 1991). For example, as the crowd grows larger, there may 
be more and more individual investors with special skills and knowledge to 
evaluate more technologically sophisticated opportunities than a smaller crowd of 
investors. Since crowdfunding relies on a large number of investors, but not the 
entire crowd to make an investment feasible, it is probable that a large enough group 
of investors with special skills and knowledge can join the crowd and improve the 
likelihood that opportunities with more technology are successful. While this may 
be the case, they may also see that there is less of an incentive for these types of 
investors to join a crowd due to the opportunity for less knowledgeable members 
of the crowd to free-ride (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1998; Sorenson and Stuart 2001). 
These types of investors may be more likely to form specialized equity 
crowdfunding platforms to benefit from their shared knowledge and reduce the risk 
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of free-riding (Lerner 1994). Future research might also find that as the crowd gets 
bigger, it becomes less discriminating in their decisions because there will be more 
money chasing fewer opportunities. 
     Future research in equity crowdfunding would also likely benefit from exploring 
the types of uncertainty inherent in new venture investments that the crowd is likely 
to have an advantage over alternative forms of new venture financing. While prior 
research has suggested that VCs and angels often maintain a competitive advantage 
because of their absorptive capacity related to a specific industry, the crowd is 
likely to maintain a competitive advantage because their absorptive capacity about 
an opportunity helps reduce information asymmetries and uncertainty that is more 
difficult to assess without the use of a large, knowledgeable crowd. Large and 
diverse crowds are more likely to make accurate prediction about how a product 
will be received by the broad market than a small group of VCs or angels. Future 
research can explore how the crowd’s absorptive capacity gives them a superior 
capability to resolve certain types of uncertainty. 
     Finally, the article only looks at equity crowdfunding in the discussion of the 
crowd and raising capital to exploit opportunities. There are many types of 
crowdfunding besides equity crowdfunding (Belleflamme, Lambert, and 
Schwienbacher 2013; Belleflamme and Lambert 2014). The model developed in 
this article may be used to test other types of crowdfunding and the effectiveness 
of the crowd in funding opportunities. For example, Allison and colleagues (2015) 
show that investors that participate on crowdfunding platforms that focus on micro-
lending opportunities seek to find the highest quality opportunity although they are 
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expecting no return on investment. Despite the lack of potential for financial gain, 
they do not simply invest in any opportunity but look for an opportunity with the 
highest potential for the entrepreneur.  The theory developed in this article can help 
explain what types of opportunities these investors will choose even with differing 
motivations by showing that these investors will invest in opportunities that have 
the lowest risk of adverse selection among members of the crowd that distribute 
salient information. 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
    This research is the first to assess how knowledge capabilities among the crowd 
impact the success or failure of new ventures participating in equity crowdfunding. 
Unlike previous assumptions about the crowd’s lack of capabilities in making new 
venture investments, the results suggest that the crowd, despite its dynamic nature, 
follows patterns related to their knowledge capabilities. For the crowd, the results 
also suggest the need to continually replenish the stock of knowledge so that there 
is not a harmful decline in the capabilities of the crowd. Future research will benefit 
from a more micro-level assessment of the knowledge of the crowd if the crowd’s 
identity is eventually made available.  Finally, for entrepreneurs, the research 
suggests that their likelihood of success in equity crowdfunding improves the more 
their opportunity matches the knowledge of the crowd. In particular, opportunities 
that are familiar to the public are more likely to be successful.        
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Appendix A: Examples of Technology Coding 
 
Excerpts From New Venture Pitches, Technology 
Coding, and Success or Failure  
Tech Success 
Savvy is a delicious and nutritious food source, designed as 
the perfect breakfast and snacking food and a much 
healthier sweet spread option. The Savvy range was 
inspired by a time-honoured sweet dip of tahini and carob 
syrup, which our founder Jonathan fell in love with while 
exploring Turkey in the ‘90’s. Carob (Ceratonia siliqua) 
was revered by many ancient cultures for its energy-
enhancing and even medicinal properties.  He brought the 
recipe home, sharing it with friends and family led to 
experiments with other ingredients such as honey, spices, 
cocoa and dates and Savvy was born 
0 1 
 
LUMO design beautifully made jackets and bags that have 
ultra-high brightness LEDs subtly incorporated behind 
fabric panels. The lights are waterproof, washable and 
powered by a small detachable USB-rechargeable battery 
unit. The LEDs are completely concealed until they are 
switched on, then visible from up to 400 meters when 
illuminated. LUMO also uses quality fabric technology and 
cycling-friendly design with the aim of ensuring that 
cyclists are kept dry, their temperature is moderated, and 
they are comfortable riding their bike. 
0 1 
 
FieldCandy is an exciting design-led brand of tents and 
outdoor lifestyle products. We inject colour, creativity and 
fun into the outdoor space by offering a range of totally 
unexpected designs. We aim to delight our customers and 
excite anyone who sees our products. FieldCandy has 
traded since Dec 2011, designing and manufacturing our 
growing range in our dedicated facility in Derbyshire, and 
selling worldwide via our website www.fieldcandy.com, 
high end retailers and B2B channels. 
0 1 
 
The Scorpion Light is a flexible, affordable and extremely 
portable lighting solution for the film, television and 
content creation market. In one box you have four lights and 
all the powering and mounting accessories you could ever 
need. Lighting has never been so easy. Designed to be the 
most versatile LEDs on the market Light anywhere and 
everything.  
0 0 
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At BorrowMyDoggy, we connect dog owners with local 
dog lovers across the UK and Ireland for walks, sitting and 
happy holidays. Through BorrowMyDoggy matches, dogs 
enjoy extra one-on-one attention and exercise, borrowers 
get to have fun, happy dog time without the full-time 
responsibility and owners have peace of mind that their dog 
is being taken care of by someone who is local, verified, 
insured, and wants to help out simply because they love 
dogs, not to get paid. 
0 0 
 
Travelling with a family can be stressful. It is a high stakes 
game – both financially and emotionally. Family Traveller, 
the core brand of Ardent Media, provides highly curated, 
useful and trusted information, and advice about travelling 
with a family. Via our different platforms (i.e. digital 
content on our website, emails, online shop, and our bi-
monthly magazine) mid to high affluent consumers can 
gather practical ideas and inspiration covering all family 
sizes, ages, and destinations. The company has generated in 
excess of £1.5m revenues since launch in 2012, and is 
raising capital to continue its UK growth, launch our digital 
platform in the US, and further develop retail channels for 
selling holidays and related products. 
0 0 
 
Snugs custom fit earphones are one of the first consumer 
earphone that are made exclusively for your ears that not 
only eliminate all of the problems of generic earphones but 
are also totally personalisable. Our 3D image scanning 
process is designed to ensure Snugs fit perfectly … 3D 
printing technology is advancing rapidly. Through our 
manufacturing partner, Dreve Otoplasik GmbH use the 
latest industrial, medical grade, 3D printers to make Snugs. 
1 1 
 
Big Sofa is a technology platform for managing visual 
content. It provides an elegant solution for managing and 
analysing large volumes of video and images by making it 
simple to securely upload, curate, mine, share, tag and 
comment on any kind of visual content. It works on content 
in any language, from any device in any country. 
1 1 
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Lingos takes advantage of this opportunity to bring together 
the value of person-to-person language learning with the 
growth of online courses. We believe that Lingos will be 
successful in opening up language learning to digital 
teaching. Lingos has a simple mission: To enable language 
learners around the world to learn directly from language 
teachers through online courses and private lessons. Lingos 
is a simple platform for mobile and online that empowers 
teachers to benefit from a transparent marketplace. On 
Lingos, language teachers market their courses and manage 
students; learners purchase digital courses, book offline 
lessons and find other students to practice with. Teachers 
build their own businesses and students choose to learn in 
whichever manner suits them best. Lingos charges a 
commission on all transactions. 
1 1 
 
Shirtly is a London based software company facilitating on 
demand shirt cleaning by connecting premium cleaning and 
delivery providers through a simple intuitive mobile app. 
We have built our own technology from ground up and 
looked at reducing and removing steps for our users, aiming 
to make ordering pick up and delivery is as smooth as 
ordering an Uber or indeed from a service providers side of 
things as easy as reading a text. 
1 0 
 
Activinsights produces wearable device to help healthcare 
professionals monitor and collect objective data about the 
lifestyles of their patients (sleeping, walking, exercise, 
sitting etc.). One week of wear provides enough data to help 
a general practitioner with differential diagnosis – it is 
designed to be an effective, low risk intervention. Lifestyle 
reports are instantly available to share with the patient. 
Wearables are also a tool for the management of long-term 
conditions such as diabetes. The Activinsights Band, 
designed for primary healthcare use, is provided for £200 a 
year complete with data services (secure with privacy-by-
design) - it is wireless, does not need charging and is fully 
waterproof.  
1 0 
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Social Marley will be the new social media dashboard for 
small but forward-thinking businesses who want to build a 
successful social media presence. Our product plan enables: 
Seamless integration of some of the most commonly used 
social media networks into one central hub meaning 
accounts can all be managed in one place. Businesses will 
be able to schedule posts, engage with their audiences and 
analyse their Facebook, Twitter, Google Plus, LinkedIn 
(and more) accounts, all from one dashboard, helping to 
enable a constant brand identity throughout the Internet. 
Social Marley aims to be affordable for small businesses 
Users will have access to invaluable analytical reports on 
their social media activity and progress at no additional cost 
beyond the subscription. 
1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
